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 Abstract: This paper presents conditions providing semiparametric identification of 
the conditional expectation of economic outcomes characterizing outmigrants using 
data on immigrant sample attrition. The approach does not require that individual 
immigrant departures be observed. Outcomes of interest are labor market earnings, 
labor force participation, and labor supply. We present a panel model which extracts 
the information on outmigrant performance from sample attrition and estimate it using 
German data. We find strong evidence of self-selection of outmigrants based on 
unobserved individual characteristics. Simulations are performed to quantify the gap 
in labor market earnings and labor force participation rates between immigrant 
stayers and outmigrants. 
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There has been a growing interest in understanding migration decisions of immigrants
leaving their adoptive homelands, a phenomena often referred to as return migration or,
more generally, as outmigration. A salient feature of theories of outmigration is that they
do not trivially predict a speciﬁc composition of departing immigrants (c.f. e.g., Borjas
and Bratsberg, 1996). It could be the case for example that persistently unsuccessful im-
migrants keep on searching for better labor market prospects and move to a new destina-
tion with higher expected outcomes (e.g., Harris and Todaro, 1970), while economically
successful immigrants with a relatively higher marginal utility of consumption in their
native country leave despite relatively lower earnings in that country (see e.g., Djajic and
Milbourne, 1988, Dustmann and Kirchkamp, 2002). This indeterminacy requires careful
forecasting of the quality of the migration ﬂows for immigration policies to meet the fu-
ture needs of the host labor market. Equally, the evaluation of potential policies requires
simulating counterfactual states and predicting behavior in those states, which in turn
requires to have a model of individual choice behavior.
In a life-cycle context, potential outmigrants base their decision on whether or not to
remain in the host country on their future expected earnings and labor market prospects,
which in turn depend on current levels of human capital, as well as on unobservable char-
acteristics such as their intrinsic ability, or the quality of their social network. The pres-
ence of such unobservable differences warrants using panel data on immigrants followed
over a relatively long period of time. As Dustmann (2002) recently pointed out, interest-
ing empirical analysis is limited by the fact that panel data sets rarely contain information
onoutmigrationdecisions.1 Rather, theytypicallycontaininformationonsampleattrition
which may or may not be the result of selective outmigration. Existing empirical evidence
is often tied to the strategy used to identify the economic parameters characterizing the
performance of outmigrants without observing individual outmigration decisions. Jasso
and Rosenzweig (1990) identify the direction of outmigration earnings selectivity by com-
paring the skill composition of speciﬁc cohorts over time. Hu (2000) and Lubotsky (2000)
estimate the parameters of the earnings function of immigrants who remain in the coun-
try, controlling for non-random outmigration selectivity by matching cross-section data
sets and longitudinal social security earnings records. These approaches provide interest-
ing insights on self-selection patterns of outmigrants. However, as is well known, census
data do not allow to incorporate unobserved time-invariant individual heterogeneity in
the choice process, a problem which may be compounded by the fact that census and
1Only recently has such data become available. See Coleman and Wadensjoe (1999) for details on Danish
data sources.
2earnings records often contain little information on both the human capital level and so-
ciological characteristics of migrants, which may increase the importance of unobservable
individual differences in explaining variations in decision making.
In this paper, we show how survey data with sample attrition can be exploited to
achieve semiparametric identiﬁcation of the true outmigration probability and of any
conditional expected outcome characterizing the performance of outmigrants when in-
formation on individual outmigration movements are not available. A notable inter-
est feature our results is that they also apply to the analysis of native departures from
under-developed countries, commonly referred to as the brain-drain problem (for a re-
view, see e.g., Bhagwati and Wilson, 1989), or to migration movements within a country
(e.g., Burda, Hardle, Muller, and Werwatz, 1998). These forms of migrations are of topical
relevance for policy makers, but often share the same observational problem, namely that
information of migration movements are not recorded at the individual level.
The ”semiparametric” nature of our results stems from the fact that the underlying
true outmigration propensity is allowed to depend on a ﬁnite number of parameters. We
demonstrate nonparametric identiﬁcation of all other parts of the model. We do not ad-
dress the more difﬁcult issue of developing semiparametric estimators of the conditional
expected outcome and deriving their asymptotic properties. The later would require de-
riving asymptotic results for products and ratios of quantities estimated using nonpara-
metric and semiparametric methods. Nevertheless, the proof of our identiﬁcation result
suggests a simple way to parametrically separate the overall attrition probability into a
probability of outmigration and a probability of attrition which is unrelated to outmi-
gration. The estimation of the later is obtained by extending models which have been
developed to deal with misclassiﬁcation of a discrete dependent variable (e.g. Hausman,
Abrevaya, and Scott-Morton, 1998) to a more general multiple equations panel data set-
ting. If true outmigration rates could be computed from the data or from other sources, it
would be straightforward to test the performance of our identiﬁcation approach by sim-
ply comparing true and predicted outmigration rates. In the more likely case where the
outmigration rates are unknown, we propose to compare the estimated attrition proba-
bility which does not result from outmigration with the sample attrition rates for a pop-
ulation with a priori negligible outmigration. In this paper, comparison is made using
a sample of individuals drawn from the native population and ﬁnd that the estimated
attrition probability which does not result from outmigration in our immigrant sample
matches very well the attrition rate in the sample of natives.
We focus our empirical analysis on estimating a multiple equation panel data model
where labor market earnings, outmigration decisions, and labor force participation are
3jointly determined by levels of human capital, several socioeconomic characteristics, and
possibly correlated unobserved individual heterogeneity. Our empirical analysis uses 8
waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel which contains detailed information on im-
migrant performance and socioeconomic characteristics. Doing so, we contribute to the
empirical literature on outmigration decision making by investigating the interactions
between outmigration and labor force participation within the context of a panel data
model. There exists indirect evidence suggesting that this interaction may in fact be as
important as that between outmigration and labor market earnings. Cohen and Eckstein
(2002) for example ﬁnd that joblessness of immigrants in Isra¨ el leads to lower welfare loss
thantheirrelativelylowerlabormarketearnings. Inthepresentpaper, weﬁndsubstantial
evidence of self-selection of outmigrants both in terms of potential labor market earnings
and in terms of work propensities. Our simulation results indicate that average log earn-
ings of outmigrants remained roughly 12% lower than those of immigrant stayers, a clear
indication that outmigrants are drawn from the bottom of the income distribution. More-
over, outmigrants are shown to have labor force participation rates 25% to 45% lower
than that of immigrant stayers over the period considered, signaling an important inter-
action between labor force participation and outmigration. These results extend those of
Constant and Massey (2003) who model outmigration of immigrants living in Germany
along with labor market earnings and labor force participation but do not control for the
possibility that immigrants differ in terms of unobservable individual abilities or other
characteristics. They ﬁnd little evidence that outmigrants are a non-randomly selected
group both in terms of earnings and labor force participation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our approach to iden-
tify the economic parameters of interest. Section 3 presents the econometric model used
to model outmigration in conjunction with the work decision and labor market earnings.
Section 4 presents the data used in the paper. Section 5 discusses the empirical results
of the model and tests for the presence of outmigration bias. It further presents some
simulation results used to evaluate the ﬁt of the model and to quantify the economic per-
formance of outmigrants. Section 6 concludes.
2 Identiﬁcation of outmigration parameters
Each immigrant of a population living in the host country is characterized by the vector
(y,ro,m) where y denotes an economic outcome of interest such as labor market earnings,
labor force participation or labor supply, m is a vector of observable characteristics, ro is a
binary indicator taking a value of 1 when the immigrant is observed to have left the panel
4and 0 otherwise. In what follows, we will use the partition m = [w,s] where s denotes
a continuous variable. We denote by ru a binary indicator taking a value of 1 when the
immigrant leaves the country of residence, and 0 otherwise. We maintain throughout
that ru is never observed. We are interested in making inferences on Efyjru = 1,mg,
the conditional expected outcome for outmigrants. The inferential problem consist of
identifying this quantity when, instead of observing outmigration, we observe a proxy
variable ro, panel attrition, which takes a value of 1 when the immigrant leaves the panel
in the following period. Outmigration and attrition are related because an immigrant
who leaves the country must also leave the panel with probability 1.
We make will maintain the following assumption throughout
Assumption A1 Efyjro,ru,mg = Efyjru,mg
This assumption says that, conditional on x and on the true outmigration indicator ru,
the measurement of the outmigration indicator does not affect the conditional expected
outcome of interest. This is similar to the classical measurement error assumption that
actual outcomes be independent of measurement errors made by researchers of survey
agencies.
The role of this assumption can be seen by using iterated expectations to express the
conditional expected labor market earnings of immigrants who leave the panel in the next
period as
Efyjro = 1,mg = Efyjro = 1,ru = 1,mg ¢ Pr(ru = 1jro = 1,m)
+Efyjro = 1,ru = 0,mg ¢ Pr(ru = 0jro = 1,m)
= Efyjru = 1,mg ¢ Pr(ru = 1jro = 1,m)
+Efyjru = 0,mg ¢ Pr(ru = 0jro = 1,m) (1)
where the second equality follows from assumption A1. This shows that the conditional
expected outcome of outmigrants is a weighted average of the conditional expected earn-
ings of outmigrants, our parameters of interest, mixed with the conditional outcome of
immigrants who remain in the host country. The mixing probabilities and the differences
in expected outcomes between immigrants who stay and those who leave control the size
of the bias. The higher the probability to confound panel drop outs for outmigrants, the
higher will be the bias, unless outmigrants and stayers have the same expected outcome.
If every immigrant who leaves the panel also leaves the country, ro perfectly measures
outmigration, and both Pr(ru = 0jro = 1,m) and the bias are zero.
In the appendix, we show that Efyjru = 1,mg can be expressed as a weighted sum
of the conditional expected outcomes for immigrants who stay in the panel and the con-
ditional expected outcome for immigrants who drop out of the panel in the following
5period, both of which are identiﬁed by the data. The weights attached to each conditional
expected outcome are shown to be functions of the mixing probabilities in equation (1).
We show that identiﬁcation of these probabilities is equivalent to identiﬁcation of the ele-
ments of the conditional attrition probability Pr(ro = 1jm), which, using the law of total
probability, can be expressed as
(2) Pr(ro = 1jm) = a10 (m) + [1¡ a10 (m)] ¢ Pr(ru = 1jm)
where a10 (m) = Pr(ro = 1jru = 0,m) denotes the probability of attrition which is un-
related to outmigration. The structure of equation (2) is mathematically equivalent to the
class of models developed for binary choice models with misclassiﬁcation of the depen-
dent variable (see, e.g., Hausman, Abrevaya, and Scott-Morton, 1998, Lewbel, 2000). The
main differences being that our ”misclassiﬁcation” is one-sided and the result of partial
observabilityoftheoutcomeratherthanfromamisclassiﬁcationormisreportmechanism.
The following assumption, taken from Lewbel (2000), identify semiparametric ver-
sions of equation (2) where Pr(ru = 1jm) is assumed to have a single index form F(sg +
w0d) where F(¢) is treated as unknown, and where a10 (m) can depend on m in an arbi-
trary way.
Assumption A2 (Lewbel, 2000) Assume a10 (m) = a10 (w) andforall w that0 · a10 (w) <
1. Assume s, conditional on w, is continuously distributed. Assume that F(m)
is three times differentiable with f(m) = dF(m)/dm and f 0(m) = df(m)/dm.
Assume jgj=1 and for all d¤ 6= d, prob([f 0(sg + w0d)/f(sg + w0d)] 6= E[f 0(sg +
w0d)/f(sg + w0d)]jsg + w0d¤).
The ﬁrst assumption says that a continuous variable s must be excluded from the
probability of attrition which is unrelated to outmigration. The role of this covariate is
to generate low outmigration probabilities F(¢) which identify a10 (w). This can be seen
by noting from (2) that Pr(ro = 1jw,s) ! a10 (w) for F(¢) ! 0. This type of exclusion
restriction is a common approach to identify semiparametric models (see e.g., Powell,
1994, section 2.5). Imposing jgj = 1 is an arbitrary free normalization, as long as g 6= 0.
The ﬁnal condition is a parametric identiﬁcation assumption to identify d from the score
function if f was known and there was no misclassiﬁcation.
We can now state the main result of this section
Lemma 1 Under Assumption A1 and A2, Efyjru = 1,mg is semiparametrically identiﬁed.
The proof of this result can be found in the appendix.
6Because attrition which is unrelated to outmigration and outmigration itself are very
different processes, the later often modelled as a life-cycle event inﬂuenced by poor labor
market performance, integration feelings, credit rationing in the home country and age
at immigration, it seems possible to ﬁnd realistic exclusion restrictions. In the case where
a vector of variables s is available, identiﬁcation of the model parameters requires that a
linear combination of s generates low outmigration probabilities, given m. Note that in
practice, conditioning a on m will be important only if a varies substantially with m. This
can be veriﬁed for example by computing marginal effects from binary choice regressions
on attrition outcomes for a sample of individuals who by construction do not outmigrate,
and test if these effects are small. In the case of developed countries, natives living in the
host country is one example of a sample not prone to outmigration.2
3 Parametric model and estimation method
The objective of the previous section was to give a sound motivation for our approach to
identify parameters characterizing the economic performance of outmigrants using sam-
ple attrition, a fact reﬂected by the semiparametric nature of the approach proposed. In
this section, we develop and estimate a parametric model which allows us to extract out-
migration behavior from panel attrition. The choice to use a parametric model rather
than a semiparametric model is threefold. First, deriving the asymptotic distribution of
semiparametric estimators of the conditional expectations of interest potentially involves
having to deal with the product and ratios of quantities estimated using both nonpara-
metric and semiparametric methods, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Second, it
is not uncommon to separate issues of identiﬁcation from issues of estimation. Identiﬁ-
cation seeks to characterize the combination of assumptions and data availability needed
to make the inferences required, assuming researchers have a sample of inﬁnite size. In
general, the less parametric are the assumptions needed for identiﬁcation, the greater the
credibility of the approach (Manski, 1995). Samples used in practice are however ﬁnite,
which raises important issues of statistical inferences for the case at hand. In particular,
it is well known that nonparametric and semiparametric estimators generate imprecise
estimates when the dimension of the conditioning set is large, as will be the case in this
section. Finally and perhaps more importantly, our preferred empirical model has the
structure of a system of three equations, motivated by our desire to allow immigrants to
select themselves into work and migration states based on their individual unobserved
2This condition is unlikely to hold in developing economies where brain drain is a likely occurrence and
conductive of selective outmigration.
7characteristics, which is hard to handle in a nonparametric or semiparametric framework.
For these reasons, we adopt the following parametric framework which ﬁrst requires
that researchers have a sample of N immigrants in period 1, where immigrant i remains
in the panel for Ti periods. For each immigrant i, we observe in period t, whether he
works pit, his monthly labor market earnings e(yit), and his attrition status ro
it in the next
period. The log of the potential labor market earnings is assumed to be generated by a
log linear earnings equation




where b are unknown parameters, h1
i is an unobserved time invariant individual speciﬁc
component of income while #1
it represents a stochastic shock. These labor market earnings
are only observable when an immigrant works. Labor force participation pit is assumed






where q are unknown parameters, h2
i is a time-invariant unobserved component and #2
it
represents some stochastic shock to the labor force participation propensity. Participation





. When pit = 1, earnings wit are
observed. Both h1
i and h2
i can be thought of capturing immigrants unobserved ability to
generate higher earnings and to ﬁnd jobs. They can also be thought of as including unob-
served family background characteristics and preferences for work and leisure. Finally,
an immigrant’s unobservable outmigration propensity r¤
it is assumed to be determined






where g are unknown parameters, h3
i captures the individual speciﬁc attachment to his
native country and #3







is assumed to be ob-
served by the immigrant who takes it into account when making his decisions but it is






be the decision rule governing
the true outmigration decision in period t + 1. Outmigration ru
it is unobservable. In our
empirical application, we assume that a10 varies over time but is independent of other
observable characteristics, which is the standard assumption made in the literature on bi-
nary choice models with misclassiﬁcation of the responses (see e.g., Hausman, Abrevaya,
and Scott-Morton, 1998; Abrevaya and Hausman, 1999; Dustmann and Van Soest, 2001,
2004), and implies the following choice probability
(6) Pr(ro
it = 1jsit) = a10(t) + [1¡ a10(t)] ¢ Pr(ru
it = 1jsit)
8In order to check the validity of this assumption, we ran probit regressions of the attrition
indicator for native Germans on a set of covariates including age, education and the num-
ber of months of labor market experience. Most variables were insigniﬁcant apart from
agewhich had a signiﬁcant and positive effecton the attrition propensity, but a small mar-
ginal effect on the attrition probability, suggesting that the probability of attrition which
is not due to outmigration does not vary substantially across individuals.3.
The earnings, work and outmigration outcomes are not likely to be independent of
each other. This will not be independent if, for example, immigrants who ﬁnd work very




i can be treated either as ﬁxed constants or as ran-
dom variables. The main advantage of the ﬁxed effect approach is that it does not require








. However, estimation of ﬁxed effects in multiple equations
nonlinear models remains today a sizeable complication, with very little guidance in the
choice of models (see the recent review of Arellano and Honor´ e, 2001). We therefore
introduce these dependencies by assuming that the stochastic time-invariant effects are
























hj denotes the variances of the unobserved heterogeneity components, and r
h
i,j de-
notes their correlations.4 These correlations are indicative of whether or not immigrants
self-select themselves into work and into outmigration based on their unobservable indi-
vidual characteristics. A signiﬁcant and positive r
h
1,2 indicates that individuals who are
more likely to work are also more likely to have higher earnings, give observed char-
acteristics. r
h
1,3 has a similar interpretation and is indicative of outmigration bias. This
coefﬁcient will be negative (positive) if immigrants who have unobserved characteristics
yielding below average monthly labor market earnings, conditional on x, tend to be those
whose unobserved characteristics yield higher (lower) probability of leaving the country
in the following period. Finally, r
h
2,3 can be interpreted as measuring outmigration bias in
the labor force participation decision and whose sign has a similar interpretation.
3Results are available upon request















= pk for k = 1,...,8 where å
8
k=1 pk = 1. Results were very
similar to those presented here. However, we had numerical difﬁculties in computing standard errors for
some of the point masses. We thus did not pursue this area further.
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w is the variance of log earnings, while the variances of the unobserved stochas-
tic shocks entering the work and outmigration equations are set to 1 for identiﬁcation
purposes. Contemporaneous correlations between the three stochastic components are




To simplify the presentation of the likelihood function, we divide the observable char-





t=1 of dependent variables, a set
Xi = fxit,zit,sitg
Ti








observed time invariant heterogeneity. Moreover, we denote by g(¢,¢,¢jhi) the trivariate
normal density, conditional on the time invariant unobservable characteristics. Numeri-
cal approximation of the likelihood function proceeds in two steps. In the ﬁrst step, the
likelihood function is computed conditional on the time invariant unobserved individual
characteristics. This ﬁrst step density is given by



































where ai,10 = [a10(1),a10(2),...,a10(Ti)]. The case where outmigration is perfectly ob-
served follows by setting all a10(t) equal to 0. The sets Wit and Pit deﬁne the domain
of integration over the wage and work spaces and vary over time as individuals make
different choices in each period according to the following table
Integration domains in period t
Qit Cit
Work ¡ [0,¥)
Not Work (¡¥,¥) (¡¥,0]
Income is integrated out in waves where individuals do not work. The integration do-
main for the work propensity follows from the labor force participation rule. In the sec-
ond step, the unconditional likelihood function is obtained by integrating out the random
individual effects over R3
f (yijXi; b,q,g,S,W,ai,10) =
Z
R3 f C (yijXi,hi; b,q,g,S,ai,10)h(hi;W)dhi
10where h denotesthe trivariate normaldensity functionwith mean vector 0 andcovariance
matrix W.
To solve the numerical integration problem, we approximate the integral by a simu-













the multivariate normal distribution H at a given value of W.5 For each draw, the con-
ditional likelihood function f C is evaluated. The partial Maximum Simulated Likelihood















The resulting estimator is inconsistent for ﬁxed R but will be consistent if R tends to
inﬁnity with the number of observations N. If
p
N/R ! 0 and with independent draw-
ings across individuals, the method is asymptotically equivalent to maximum likelihood
(Train, 2003).
A side product of our empirical model is that we can look into the recently debated
issue of whether selective outmigration biases rates of immigrant economic assimilation.
This possibility was noted among other by Schultz (1998)? and conﬁrmed using Swedish
data by Edin, LaLonde and Aslund (2000) ? who ﬁnd that their measure of assimilation
is sensitive to selective outmigration. Contrary to that paper, we will compute assimila-
tion rates using the most commonly used deﬁnition of assimilation (for an overview, see
Borjas, 1999) deﬁned as the differential in earnings between immigrants and natives with

















Estimation of the derivative for immigrants is done using estimates of the returns to ex-
perience and the returns to an extra year in the Germany. For Germans, the passage of
time is modelled as an increase in log earnings resulting from one year of labor market
experience. To estimate this change in log earnings, we will model labor market earnings
and work decisions of Germans using similar speciﬁcations of equations (3) and (4) and
estimate the parameters using the simulation techniques described above.
4 Data
The data used in this paper is taken from the public use ﬁle of the GSOEP and covers
the 1985-1999 period. Until 1990, the GSOEP consisted of a sample of households with
5In this paper, we use sequences of 100 Halton draws (see, e.g., Train, 2003).
11German heads living in former West-Germany and an over-sample of immigrants living
in West-Germany coming from countries which had signed a bilateral migration agree-
ment with Germany in the 1950s and 1960s namely Greece, Italy, Spain, Turkey and Yu-
goslavia.6 Data on speaking ﬂuency, integration feelings of immigrants, intended length
of stay and remittances directed to their family living outside Germany were given in
consecutive waves from 1984 until 1987. Starting in 1987, this information was gathered
every other year. In order to keep constant the time period between observations, we
have chosen to keep the 8 waves of the panel where detailed information on immigrants
was available, each spanned by one year, starting in 1985 and ending in 1999. We re-
strict our attention to males between 18 and 64 years of age during the 1985-1999 period.
Excluded from the sample are individuals who died during the observation period and
individuals who gave incomplete information on any single variable entering the empir-
ical model in any of the 8 waves. This leaves us with a sample of 1987 native Germans
and 732 immigrants starting in 1985.
The identiﬁcation approach presented in section 2 relies on the information contained
in panel attrition. It becomes instructive to contrast the attrition pattern of our immigrant
sample with that of Germans whose attrition cannot obviously be attributed to outmigra-
tion. Table 1 contains information on the number of individuals observed along with the
percentage of the original 1985 sample who remains in a given wave.7 41.9% of Germans
and 26.7% of immigrants have been interviewed successfully in all the waves. The attri-
tion rate in a given wave is deﬁned as the percentage of individuals not observed in the
given wave but observed in the preceding wave. Over our sample period, an average of
11.6% of the remaining Germans and 17.2% of immigrants drop out of the panel every
two years. In the case of Germans, outmigration is de facto not an issue. Assuming that
the difference in attrition rates is due to outmigration, a back of the envelope calculation
implies that we would expect the outmigration rate in our sample of immigrants to be 6%
every two years, or 3% per year, a number which would be in line with those reported
in the literature (see Borjas and Bratsberg, 1996). Of course, this calculation relies on the
assumption that attrition in the immigrant population which is not due to outmigration is
of comparable magnitude to that of natives. We will come back to this in section 5 which
reports indirect evidence suggesting that this is a plausible assumption.
The top panel of Figure 1 shows the average monthly gross income for working immi-
grants and Germans over the period covered. In 1985, the mean income of Germans was
3,357 DM per month compared to 2,690 DM per month for immigrants, giving an income
6Immigrants of Portuguese nationality are not included in the panel.
7Figures are adjusted for individuals truncated out of the sample as they reached 66 years of age.
12ratio of 1.25 favoring Germans. The mean wage differential remaind relatively steady
until 1991, after which, the mean income differential widened even more between the
two groups to reach a ratio of 1.34 in 1999, with Germans receiving an average monthly
wage of 5,848 DM while immigrants were receiving 4,348 DM per month. The diverging
economic progress of Germans and immigrants after 1991 is also reﬂected in the work
frequencies. The bottom panel of ﬁgure 1 shows the sample frequencies of individuals
working in the month preceding the interview. We can see that until 1991, labor force
participation was very similar for both Germans and immigrants. After 1991, we observe
a steady decline in the work frequencies for both groups which coincides with the general
deterioration of the labor market in West-Germany. During that period, the percentage of
immigrants working remained steadily below that of Germans.
Deﬁnitions and summary statistics of all the independent variables we use are pre-
sented in Table 2. We see that immigrants migrated to Germany early in their productive
lives, a fact reﬂected by an average age at immigration of nearly 24 years, indicating that
most migrants were old enough to autonomously decide to move to Germany.
5 Results and simulations
Three speciﬁcations were estimated to separate the effect of work selection from the effect
of outmigration selection on labor market earnings. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation consisted of
a univariate model of labor market earnings equation with random effects. The second
speciﬁcation consisted of a bivariate model of labor market earnings and work. Compar-
ison of the second speciﬁcation with the ﬁrst allows us to evaluate the role of work se-
lection on labor market earnings ignoring possible outmigration selection. The third and
ﬁnal speciﬁcation consisted of our complete model, where labor market earnings, labor
force participation and outmigration decisions are simultaneously determined. Compari-
son of the third and second speciﬁcation reveals the role played by outmigration selection
when accounting for work selectivity. The regressors included in the earnings and work
equations included education, labor market experience and its square, reported speak-
ing ﬂuency in German, and the number of years since immigration to Germany. We use
reported health satisfaction as the exclusion restriction in the work equation. Reported
health satisfaction is a valid exclusion restriction if health problems occur mostly at a time
in which an individual is more likely to have found a stable job whose continuation de-
pends on the worker’s choices. Our choice of regressors for the outmigration equation
is motivated by existing theoretical explanations for outmigration (see the Introduction).
We included whether or not the wife of an immigrant lives in Germany to capture effects
13of family unity, reported feelings of belonging to the Germans society, reported health
satisfaction, and self-reported expected length of stay in Germany, the later is included
to capture part of the anticipatory behavior of migrants which is consistent with forward
looking decision making. We also included age at arrival to capture incentives of immi-
grant’s who arrive at a young age to acquire country speciﬁc human capital.
The effects of local labor market conditions and other macroeconomic ﬂuctuations are
captured by including in all equations the yearly state level unemployment rate and year
ﬁxed effects. We additionally experimented with an alternative speciﬁcation of the out-
migration equation which contained education, labor market experience and its square,
speaking ﬂuency, and years since immigration as regressors. A log-likelihood ratio test of
the null hypothesis that these human capital variables have no joint effect on outmigra-
tion could not be rejected at conventional levels (p-value = 0.221).
5.1 Results
5.1.1 Outmigration and non-outmigration related attrition
The top panel of Figure 2 plots the sample attrition rates of the immigrant sample taken
from Table 1 along side the estimated sample attrition rates, the later computed by aver-
aging the predicted outmigration probabilities for immigrants in each relevant wave. We
ﬁnd that the model ﬁt is very good for all waves considered. In particular, the model cap-
tures well the episode associated with a decrease in sample attrition rates between 1985
and 1991 and the episode associated with an increase in sample attrition which occurred
between 1991 and 1999.
Inordertogetafeelingfortheimportanceofoutmigrationinexplainingbothepisodes,
we broke down the estimated sample attrition rates into predicted outmigration rates and
non-outmigration related outmigration rates. Table 3 presents estimates of a10 in each
wave along with standard errors. We ﬁnd the non-outmigration related attrition rates to
be well estimated in all waves. The middle panel of Figure 2 plots these rates alongside
the predicted outmigration rates, the later obtained by averaging predicted outmigration
probabilities over all immigrants in each wave. We ﬁnd that non-outmigration related
attrition remained a more important source of sample attrition than outmigration over
the horizon considered. The episode of decrease in sample attrition between 1987 and
1991 is predicted to be the result of a simultaneous decrease in both outmigration and
non-outmigration related attrition rates. In particular, starting with a non-outmigration
related attrition rate above 15% in 1987, three times greater than the corresponding level
of outmigration related attrition, both sources of attrition diminished over the follow-
14ing waves, with outmigration rates falling to 2.5% immediately following the economic
recovery of 1991. The episode associated with an increase in the sample attrition rates
between 1991 and 1999 is predicted to be the result of an important increase in non-
outmigration related attrition and a relatively more benign decrease in outmigration rates
which, again, indicate that most of the observed ﬂuctuations in sample attrition rates re-
sults from ﬂuctuations in non-outmigration related attrition, while outmigration rates
oscillated around the level of 6% per two years span.
It is interesting to report that the estimated values of a10 over our time horizon closely
follow the sample attrition rates of the German sample, a sample with presumably little
outmigration related attrition. The bottom panel of Figure 2 plots both lines. We ﬁnd
that apart from the higher non-outmigration related attrition rate in 1999, both attrition
rates followed each other closely. Both rates are directly comparable if the true level of
non-outmigration related attrition is of comparable magnitude in both populations. We
do not have direct information on this similarity. However, because we excluded from
our sample individuals who died during our observation window, the non-outmigration
related sample attrition we observe can result from either untraceable individual mobility
within the country or individual refusal to continue participating in the panel. Concern-
ing the former possibility, Clark and Drever (2001) ﬁnd that immigrants in the GSOEP
sample are not more likely to move within Germany than natives, while Pischke and Vel-
ling (1997) ﬁnd that immigrants in the western parts of Germany live in regions with a
high concentration of ethnic minorities. Both results suggests that, if anything, survey
institutes should not have greater difﬁculties in tracking mobile immigrants than mobile
natives. Concerning refusals, Spiess and Pannenberg (2003) present evidence suggesting
that the proportions of individuals refusing to participate in each wave once contacted
is approximately the same in both the Germans and immigrant samples. Both sets of
evidence point to similar non-outmigration related attrition rates in both populations.
From the results of section 2, semiparametric identiﬁcation of the economic perfor-
mance of outmigrants in the context of the present empirical model, which conditions a10
on the time dimension, requires that there exist immigrants with extremely low outmi-
gration probabilities in each wave. Assuming correct model speciﬁcation, we check for
this by computing percentiles of the predicted outmigration probability distribution in
each wave of the sample. The 25th percentile of the predicted outmigration probability
distribution oscillated between 0.69% in 1985 and 0.81% in 1997, indicating the presence
of a considerable amount of immigrants with an outmigration probability close to 0 in all
our waves.
155.1.2 Determinants of outmigration
Table 3 presents estimates of the outmigration equation alongside the estimated non-
outmigration related attrition rates. We ﬁnd that immigrants whose wife lives with them
in Germany have a signiﬁcantly lower probability of outmigration, reﬂecting some pref-
erences for family unity. Immigrants satisﬁed with their health are signiﬁcantly less likely
to outmigrate, a ﬁnding consistent with the sociological ﬁndings reported in Stark (1998).
Intendedlength of stay capturestheexpectations of immigrants and offersdirectinforma-
tion on their remigration intentions. We ﬁnd that migrants who expect to remain longer
in Germany are also less likely to outmigrate, indicating that our immigrants react to
preestablished life-cycle plans, indicating elements of forward looking decision making.
Deteriorations of the local labor market conditions, reﬂected in higher unemployment
rates, have a positive and signiﬁcant effect on the likelihood of leaving the country. The
effect of cumulative savings returned to the home country is not signiﬁcant, implying
that immigrants who have saved and returned more money to their native country are
not more likely to outmigrate. Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002) ﬁnd that Turkish return
migrants have accumulated enough wealth in Germany to start up businesses in their
home country upon their return. Because Turks are the biggest ethnic group in our sam-
ple, we would expect that increasing remittances increase the probability of outmigration
if the money returned is intended to be eventually invested in a business. Our results sug-
gest that migrants returned money to help relatives rather than for investment purposes.
Finally, immigrant’s feelings of integration in the German society are not correlated with
outmigration.
5.1.3 Earnings and labor force participation equations
Table 4 presents parameter estimates of the earnings and work equations for the immi-
grant and German samples for all three speciﬁcations. Focusing ﬁrst on the more general
model which controls for both work and outmigration selectivity, we ﬁnd that the returns
to education of immigrants are roughly one third those of Germans, where an extra year
of schooling raises earnings of Germans by 9.2% and those of immigrants by 2.9%. La-
bor market earnings have the usual concave relation to experience, with an extra year of
labor market experience raises earnings of Germans by 0.6% compared to 0.32% for im-
migrants. As expected, immigrants with better speaking ﬂuency have higher earnings.8
Finally, higher unemployment rates are associated with lower earnings in the immigrant
8Dustmann and van Soest (2001) show that the self-reported speaking ﬂuency indicator of the GSOEP is
measured with noise, a feature which biased downwards the effect of speaking ﬂuency on earnings. Due
to the complexity of their correction, we have not attempted to include it in the present study.
16population (at the 10% signiﬁcance level) but do not affect labor market earnings of the
native population. Given we include controls for time periods, identiﬁcation of this effect
relies on regional variations across provinces in Germany. The effect of unemployment on
earningsthusreﬂectsthatatanypointintime, earningsdifferacrossprovincesdepending
on the tightness of the local labor market.
When controlling for outmigration selectivity, we control for the fact that the sample
of immigrants observed over time has above average conditional earnings relative to the
population expectation. We then expect that the returns to some human capital factors
will be lower in the overall immigrant population than in the population of permanent
migrants. Changes in the returns to education when controlling or not for outmigration
goes along those lines. We ﬁnd that the returns to education of immigrants passes from
2.9% when outmigration is accounted for to 3.5% when we do not control for outmigra-
tion. This change is consistent with the hypothesis that permanent migrants have above
average labor market earnings. The coefﬁcient of years since migration progressively de-
creases as less selection is accounted for, passing from 0.079 to 0.073 when controlling for
work selectivity to 0.069 without any selection controls, although these changes are not
signiﬁcant. Finally, the coefﬁcient of the linear term of labor market experience increases
while the coefﬁcient of the quadratic term decreases when outmigration is not accounted
for. Again, both these changes are not signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
The robustness of parameter estimates to controls for work and outmigration selec-
tivity has a direct implication for estimates of the economic assimilation rates computed
on the basis of equation (7), which we evaluated at the sample average of the labor mar-
ket experience for both the immigrant and native samples in 1985. The estimate of the
assimilation rate is found to be -5.00% per year when outmigration is not accounted for,
and raises to -4.78% when outmigration is accounted for, a statistically insigniﬁcant in-
crease, which indicates that the lack of assimilation observed cannot be accounted for by
selective immigrant departures. Contrary to the results of Edin, LaLonde, and Aslund
(2000) for Sweden who found strong effects, our approach is conditional on observable
characteristics.
The results for the labor force participation equation are in line with those of the earn-
ings equation, both in terms of the sign of the effects and on the robustness of the para-
meters to outmigration selection. Education and labor market experience have positive
effects on the probability of working. Higher unemployment rates have a negative ef-
fect on the work probability while immigrants and natives with better reported health
satisfaction have a higher probability of working. Speaking ﬂuency has a positive effect
on work participation while the number of years since immigration has a negative and
17signiﬁcant impact on work participation. Similar to earnings, we ﬁnd that parameter es-
timates of the immigrant work propensity are quite robust to return migration selectivity.
5.1.4 Covariance structure
Table 5 presents estimates of the covariance structure of all three speciﬁcations. Focusing
on the most general model which controls for both work and outmigration selection, we
ﬁnd that transitory shocks between earnings and work, and shocks between work and
outmigration, are all signiﬁcantly negatively correlated, the former at -34.2% and the lat-
ter at -27.8%, while we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant correlation between the transitory shocks of
the earnings and outmigration processes. The negative correlation between the transitory
shocks of the earnings and work equations is somewhat unexpected since it implies that
conditional of observable and unobservable heterogeneity, those attracted to work at the
same time have lower expected log earnings. As we show below, these transitory shocks
explain only a small part of the overall unexplained variation in the three economic out-
comes.







is found to be small but signiﬁcant, indicating that individuals with higher
propensities to working are more likely to have higher earnings. The correlation be-













is -49.8%, both signiﬁcant at the
1% level. Both correlations suggest that individuals with a higher propensity to outmi-
grate are those with both a lower probability of ﬁnding work, and lower labor market
earnings, which points to a clear pattern of negative outmigration selection. When com-
paring results with the bivariate model which does not correct for outmigration, we ﬁnd
that the estimated correlation between the time-invariant unobserved components in the
earnings and work equations (r
h
1,2) remains stable, which indicates the robustness of the
selection into work effect to non-random immigrant departures.
Relativetothetransitoryshocks, theseunobservedindividualeffectsaccountfor53.8%
of the unexplained variation in labor market earnings, and respectively 73.9% and 74.5%
of the unexplained variation of the labor force participation and outmigration propensity,
a clear indication of their relative importance in determining all three outcomes and the
inherent selection patterns.9
Results for Germans are similar to that of the immigrant sample, with a small but
9Both Var(#2
it) and Var(#2
it) are normalized to 1. Hence, the total unexplained variations in both the labor
force participation and the outmigration equations are respectively 1+ s2
h and 1+ s3
h. The shares out of the
total variance are thus estimated to be 2.834/[1+2.834]=0.739 and 2.934/[1+2.934]=0.745.






. Unobserved individual heterogene-
ity effects account for 61.5% of the unexplained variation in labor market earnings, and
74.5% of the the unexplained variation in labor force participation, ﬁgures which are sim-
ilar to those of immigrants.
5.2 Simulations
Simulations are used for two purposes. First, they allow to check whether our model
provides a good ﬁt to the data. Secondly, they allow us to quantify the implications of
earnings and work propensities on outmigration selectivity.
Our simulations were done in the following way. For each individual appearing in the








. Then, in each time period, we draw for each immigrant appearing







. The draws from the time invariant stochastic components are then matched
to the draws of the transitory stochastic components and used to predict whether the
immigrant will work and whether he will outmigrate in the next period. We compute
the predicted log earnings for each immigrant predicted to work in a given wave. Sim-
ulations are then averaged over all draws and individuals. Simulations for the German
sample follow a similar path. Simulation results are presented in Table 6. The ﬁt for the
German sample is very good, with both real and simulated paths closely following each
other over the entire sample period. Simulated log earnings paths of immigrants are good
up till 1991, after which, the model tends to over predict the monthly log earnings. Part of
these discrepancies can be attributed to the progressively small immigrant sample sizes in
the latter years, a fact reﬂected in the increasing dispersion of the simulated log earnings
estimates over time (not shown here).
The empirical results of the previous section indicated that outmigrants were selected
from the bottom of the earnings and work propensity distributions of the immigrant pop-
ulation. To gain some insights into the economic performance gap between immigrants
who remained in Germany and those who left, we took the simulations which were used
to compute results for immigrants in Table 6 and separated them into a group of predicted
outmigrants and a group of predicted stayers. The top panel of Figure 6 reports simula-
tions of log earnings while the bottom panel reports the simulated work propensities. In
1985, the log earnings of outmigrants where 11.1% lower than those of the immigrant
stayers. This gap widened to 14.1% in 1991 before dropping back to a gap of 11.9% in
1997. The gap in work propensities between immigrant stayers and outmigrants also
conﬁrms the strong negative outmigration selectivity. Outmigrants are predicted to have
19a work propensity 25% lower than that of immigrant stayers in 1985. In 1995, at the end
of the economic downturn, this gap climbed to nearly 44%.
Overall, these simulations clearly indicate that the economic performance of outmi-
grants in the wave preceding their departure was dramatically worse than that of stayers,
both in terms of earnings and probabilities of working. These results differ from those of
Constant and Massey (2002) who do not report evidence that outmigrants leaving Ger-
many during the same time period are self-selected in any particular direction. The main
difference between both papers is that their econometric model excludes selection based
on individual unobservable characteristics. As we argued in the introduction, we have
good theoretical reasons to believe that such unobservable factors play an important role
in shaping immigrant performance and their resulting durations of stay in the host coun-
try. Our simulations have conﬁrmed this importance and suggest that selection patterns
may be sensitive to whether unobserved individual characteristics are accounted for.
6 Conclusions
This paper has presented a general framework to analyze the determinants of outmigra-
tion and to identify and estimate the economic parameters characterizing the economic
performance of outmigrants which does not require empirical researchers to observe out-
migration decisions, which fully exploits the advantages of panel data sets by allowing
individuals to differ with respect to unobservable differences such as their intrinsic abil-
ity to reap labor market beneﬁts, and which has the potential to be applied in countries
with an ongoing panel of immigrants. Conditions for semiparametric identiﬁcation of
the conditional expected outcomes have been presented. The main condition requires an
exclusion restriction sufﬁcient to induce low probabilities of immigrant departures.
Weappliedourframeworktoestimateathreeequationpaneldatamodelwhichsimul-
taneously determines labor market earnings, the labor force participation decision, and
the outmigration decision. Estimates of our model predict an annual outmigration rate of
3%. Our simulation results clearly indicated the importance of accounting for unobserved
heterogeneity in the context of outmigration in Germany. Contrary to existing evidence,
we found clear patterns of negative outmigration selection attributed to individual differ-
ences in unobserved characteristics. Moreover, unobserved heterogeneity was found to
explain the greater part of the unexplained variation in earnings, work, and outmigration
outcomes, a ﬁnding which warrants their inclusion in the model. Simulations revealed
that outmigrants have between 11% and 14% lower expected labor market log earnings,
andbetween25%and44%lowerprobabilitiesofworkingoverthe1985-1999periodwhen
20compared to immigrants who remain in Germany. These results clearly indicate that im-
migration policies aimed at improving the economic performance of immigrants were
not sufﬁcient to bridge the gap between immigrants and natives. If Germany’s optimal
immigration policy requires a mixture of both skilled and unskilled labor, then the neg-
ative selection of departing immigrants found in this paper is a source of concern. Our
results indicated that policies which affect expected planed migration durations, barriers
to family unity, and age of immigrants at entry, are likely to have a signiﬁcant impact of
immigrant departures, and may serve as useful tools in adapting the immigrant pool to
the needs of the German labor market.
Extending the present analysis to other countries would not only shed light on the
robustness of the method, but also improve and extend international comparisons of out-
migrationbehaviorwithinauniﬁedframework. Theidentiﬁcationstrategyproposedalso
allows to estimate many more economic models than the one presented in this paper. A
noteworthy extension is to use the present framework to estimate economic structural dy-
namic life-cycle model of outmigration decision making, directly aligning the theory with
the empirical data. As mentioned in the introduction, the approach presented here can
also be used to study migration movements other than those of immigrants. Burda, Har-
dle, Muller, and Werwatz (1998) for example study migration of native Germans from the
East to West-Germany following reuniﬁcation using data on intentions to migrate rather
than actual migration movements, the later which were difﬁcult to observe in their panel
data set. The framework proposed here suggests that an extension to analyze such mi-
grations is promising.
21Proof of Lemma 1
Under Assumption A1, the conditional expected outcome of immigrants who remain in
the panel is given by
Efyjro = 0,mg = Efyjru = 1,mg ¢ Pr(ru = 1jro = 0,m) (8)
+Efyjru = 0,mg ¢ Pr(ru = 0jro = 0,m)
= Efyjru = 0,mg (9)
where the last equality follows from the fact that an immigrant cannot be observed to
have left the country given he is observed to be in the panel (Pr(ru = 1jro = 0,m) = 0).
Substituting (9) in (1) and solving for Efyjru = 1,mg we obtain
Efyjru = 1,mg = Efyjro = 1,mg ¢ W1 (m)
¡1
¡Efyjro = 0,mg ¢ W0 (m) ¢ W1 (m)
¡1 (10)
which represents a weighted average of two conditional expectations which are nonpara-
metrically identiﬁed from the data. The weights are given by




W1 (m) = Pr(ru = 1jro = 1,m)








where a10 (m) ´ Pr(ro = 1jru = 0,m). The attrition probability Pr(ro = 1jm) is identi-
ﬁed from the sample attrition in the data.
What remains to be identiﬁed is Pr(rujm) and a10 (m). Imposing the following single
index structure Pr(rujm) = F(sg + w0d), identiﬁcation of the sign of g and of d follows
Assumption A2 and Lemma 1 of Lewbel (2000), while identiﬁcation of F(¢) and a10 (w)
follow from assumption A2 and Lemma 2 of Lewbel (2000). Hence, Pr(rujm) and a10 (m)











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24a10 (1987) 0.151 Constant -0.034
(0.036) (0.489)
a10 (1989) 0.121 Health satisfaction -0.084
(0.037) (0.028)
a10 (1991) 0.060 Wife in Germany -0.681
(0.026) (0.183)
a10 (1993) 0.112 Expected length of stay -0.589
(0.025) (0.119)
a10 (1995) 0.072 Integration feeling 0.030
(0.028) (0.067)
a10 (1997) 0.121 Unemployment rate 0.066
(0.037) (0.029)
a10 (1999) 0.205 Age at immigration / 102 1.608
(0.032) (0.711)
Cumulative remittances / 103 -0.003
(0.014)
Table 3: Estimation results for the attrition and outmigration processes. Asymptotic stan-
dard errors in parentheses. Wave dummies were included in the outmigration propensity
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Log monthly earnings and work propensities - Germans and immigrants








Observed sample attrition −− immigrants 
Predicted sample attrition −− immigrants 










Non−outmigration related attrition −− immigrants 









Non−outmigration related attrition −− immigrants 
Observed sample attrition −− native germans 
Figure 2: Top graph: true (full-circles) and predicted (dashed-squares) sample attrition
rates for the immigrant sample. Middle graph: Predicted outmigration (dashed-circles)
and non-outmigration related (dotted-diamonds) attrition rates. Bottom graph: Predicted
non-outmigration related attrition rate for immigrants (dotted-diamonds) and observed

















































































































































Figure 3: Top panel: simulated log earnings for immigrants over the 1985-
1997 period. All, Stayers and Outmigrants refer to simulations averaged
respectively over all immigrants, predicted stayers only and predicted out-
migrants only. Simulations in each period are obtained by taking for each







over all draws the predicted earnings of those predicted to work. Bottom
panel: Simulated proportion of immigrants working in the 1985-1997 pe-
riod. Simulations are performed as in the top panel.
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